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INTRODUCTION 
Ranking functions have been introduced under the name of ordinal conditional 
functions in Spohn (1988; 1990). They are representations of epistemic states and their 
dynamics. The most comprehensive and up to date presentation is Spohn (manuscript). 
 
BACKGROUND 
The literature on knowledge, belief, and uncertainty in artificial intelligence is 
divided into two broad classes. In epistemic logic (Hintikka 1961, Halpern & Fagin & 
Moses & Vardi 1995), belief revision theory (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 
1985, Gärdenfors 1988, Rott 2001), and nonmonotonic reasoning (Kraus & Lehmann & 
Magidor 1990, Makinson 2005) qualitative approaches are used to represent the 
epistemic state of an agent. In probability theory (Pearl 1988, Jeffrey 2004) and 
alternatives (Dempster 1968, Shafer 1976, Dubois & Prade 1988) epistemic states are 
represented quantitatively as degrees of belief rather than yes-or-no beliefs (see Halpern 
2003 for an overview). One of the distinctive features of ranking functions is that they are 
quantitative, but nevertheless induce a notion of yes-or-no belief that satisfies the 
standard requirements of rationality, viz. consistency and deductive closure. 
 
 RANKING FUNCTIONS 
Let W be a non-empty set of possibilities or worlds, and let A be a field of 
propositions over W. That is, A is a set of subsets of W that includes the empty set  ( 
 A) and is closed under complementation with respect to W (if A  A, then W\A  A) 
and finite intersection (if A  A and B  A, then AB  A). A function  from the field 
A over W into the natural numbers N extended by , : A  N{}, is a (finitely 
minimitive) ranking function on A if and only if for all propositions A, B in A: 
(1) (W) = 0 
(2) () =  
(3) (AB) = min{(A), (B)} 
If the field of propositions A is closed under countable intersection (if A1  A, …, An  
A, …, n  N, then A1…An…  A) so that A is a -field, a ranking function  on A 
is countably minimitive if and only if it holds for all propositions A1  A,… An  A, … 
(4) (A1…An…) = min{(A1), …, (An), …} 
If the field of propositions A is closed under arbitrary intersection (if B  A, then B  
A) so that A is a -field, a ranking function  on A is completely minimitive if and only if 
it holds for all sets of propositions B  A: 
(5) (B) = min{(A): A  B} 
A ranking function  on A is regular just in case (A) <  for each non-empty or 
consistent proposition A in A. 
The conditional ranking function (|): AA  N{} based on the ranking function  
on A is defined such that for all propositions A, B in A: 
 (6) (A|B) = (AB) – (B) if A  , and (|B) =  
(|B) is a ranking function on A, for each proposition B in A. 
A function  from the set of worlds W into the natural numbers N, : W  N, is a 
pointwise ranking function on W if and only if (w) = 0 for at least one world w in W. 
Each pointwise ranking function  on W induces a regular and completely minimitive 
ranking function  on every field of propositions A over W by defining 
 (5) (A) = min{(w): w  A} (=  if A = ) 
Huber (2006) discusses under which conditions a ranking function on a field of 
propositions A induces a pointwise ranking function on the underlying set of worlds W. 
The rank of a proposition A, (A), represents the degree to which an agent with 
ranking function  disbelieves A. If (A) = 0, the agent does not disbelieve A. However, 
this does not mean that she believes A. She may well suspend judgment and neither 
disbelieve A nor its complement or negation W\A (in this case (A) = (W\A) = 0). 
Rather, belief in a proposition is characterized by disbelief in its negation: an agent with 
ranking function : A  N{} believes A  A if and only if (W\A) > 0. The belief set 
Bel of an agent with ranking function : A  N{} is the set of all propositions she 
believes: 
 Bel = {A  A: (W\A) > 0} 
The axioms of ranking theory require an agent to not disbelieve both a proposition and its 
negation – i.e. at least one of A, W\A has to be assigned rank 0. Thus an agent with 
ranking function : A  N{} believes A  A if and only if (W\A) > (A). For a 
 given : A  N{}, this suggests to define the belief function induced by , : A  
Z{}, such that for all propositions A in A: 
(A) = (W\A) – (A) 
 assigns positive numbers to the propositions that are believed, negative numbers to the 
propositions that are disbelieved, and 0 to those propositions and their negations with 
respect to which the agent suspends judgment. As a consequence, 
 Bel = {A  A: (A) > 0} 
Bel is consistent and deductively closed in the finite sense, for every ranking function  
on A. That is, B   for every finite B  Bel; and A  Bel if there is a finite B  Bel 
such that B  A, for any A  A. If : A  N{} is countably/completely minimitive, 
Bel is consistent and deductively closed in the following countable/complete sense: B 
  for every countable/arbitrary B  Bel; and A  Bel if there is a countable/arbitrary 
B  Bel such that B  A, for any A  A. As will be seen below, from a diachronic 
point of view the converse is true as well. However, first we have to discuss how an 
epistemic agent is to update her ranking function when she learns new information. 
 
Update Rules 
A theory of epistemic states is incomplete if it does not account for the way the 
epistemic states are updated when the agent receives new information. As there are 
different formats in which the agent may receive new information, there are different 
update rules. The simplest and most unrealistic case is that of the agent becoming certain 
of a new proposition. This case is covered by 
Plain Conditionalization 
 If the agent’s epistemic state at time t is represented by the ranking function  on A, 
and if, between t and t’, the agent becomes certain of the proposition E  A and of 
no logically stronger proposition E+  E, E+  A, then the agent’s epistemic state 
at time t’ should be represented by the ranking function ’ = (|E) on A. 
We usually do not learn by becoming certain of a proposition, though. In most cases the 
new information merely changes the strength of our beliefs in various propositions. This 
is illustrated by a variation of an example due to Jeffrey (1983). Let our agent be 
interested in the color of the carpet of her hotel room. At time t, before checking in, she 
neither believes nor disbelieves any of the following three hypotheses: the carpet is beige 
(beige), the carpet is brown (brown), the carpet is black (black). However, she is certain 
that the carpet is either beige or brown or black. The relevant part of her ranking function 
at time t thus looks as follows: (beige) = (not beige) = (brown) = (not brown) = 
(black) = (not black) = (beige or brown or black) = 0, (neither beige nor brown nor 
black) = . 
At time t’, after checking in and when opening the door to her room, it appears to 
the agent that the carpet is rather dark. As a consequence she now believes that the carpet 
is either brown or black. But since it is late at night, the curtains are closed, and she has 
not turned on the light yet, she cannot tell whether the carpet is brown or black. Her ranks 
for the relevant propositions thus change to the following values: ’(beige) = ’(not 
brown) = ’(not black) = 1, ’(not beige) = ’(brown) = ’(black) = 0. 
A change in the strength of the agent’s beliefs about the color of the carpet will 
affect the strength of her beliefs about the color of, say, the furniture in the hotel room. 
For instance, at time t, our agent is pretty confident that the hotel room does not have 
 dark furniture if the carpet is brown – and similarly if the carpet is black. She is also 
pretty confident that the hotel room has dark furniture if the carpet is beige. The relevant 
part of her ranking function at time t looks as follows: (dark|brown) = (dark|black) = 3, 
(dark|beige) = 0. This implies that, at time t, the agent neither believes the furniture is 
dark nor that it is not dark, (dark) = (not dark) = 0. 
The important question now is how the agent should update the rest of her ranking 
function (including the ranks for the propositions about the color of the furniture) when 
her ranks for the propositions about the color of the carpet change as specified above. The 
answer, already formulated in Spohn (1988), is given by 
Spohn Conditionalization 
If the agent’s epistemic state at time t is represented by the ranking function  on 
A, and if, between t and t’, the agent’s ranks on the partition {E1, …, En, …} 
change to r1, …, rn, …, respectively, where min{r1, …, rn, …} = 0, then the 
agent’s epistemic state at time t’ should be represented by the ranking function ’ 
= min{(|E1) + r1, …, (|En) + rn, …} on A. 
Applied to our example this means that, at time t’, the agent’s rank for the proposition 
that the furniture is dark should be ’(dark) = min{(dark|beige) + 1, (dark|brown) + 0, 
(dark|black) + 0} = 1. That is, at time t’, the agent believes, if only very weakly, that the 
furniture is not dark. 
Spohn Conditionalization covers Plain Conditionalization as a special case. Shenoy 
(1991) presents an update rule for evidence of a still different format. 
 
 Justification 
Ranking theory tells an epistemic agent how to organize her beliefs, and how to 
update her beliefs when she receives new information of various formats. Why should the 
agent follow those prescriptions? 
The answer to this question requires a bit of terminology. An agent’s degree of 
entrenchment for the proposition A is the number of information sources providing the 
information A that it takes for the agent to give up her disbelief in A. If the agent does not 
disbelieve A to begin with, her degree of entrenchment for A is 0. If no finite number of 
information sources providing the information A makes the agent give up her disbelief in 
A, her degree of entrenchment for A is . 
Degrees of entrenchment are used to measure an epistemic agent’s degrees of 
disbelief. If you want to measure my degree of disbelief for the proposition that Madrid is 
the capitol of Spain, you put me on a busy plaza in the center of Madrid and count the 
number of people passing by and telling me that Madrid is the capitol of Spain. My 
degree of entrenchment for the proposition that Madrid is the capitol of Spain equals n 
just in case I stop disbelieving that Madrid is the capitol of Spain after n people have 
passed by and told me it is – provided all those people are independent and equally 
reliable, indeed minimally positively reliable. Most people (and certainly all people in 
Madrid) are more than minimally positively reliable, though. An agent’s degree of 
disbelief in A is therefore defined as the number of information sources providing the 
information A that it would take for the agent to give up her disbelief that A if those 
information sources were independent and minimally positively reliable. 
 Now we can explain why an agent’s degrees of disbelief should obey the ranking 
calculus and thus be ranks, and why she should update her ranks according to Spohn 
Conditionalization. She should do so because doing so is necessary and sufficient for her 
to always have consistent and deductively closed beliefs. More precisely, Huber (2007) 
proves the following 
Consistency Theorem 
An agent’s belief set is and will always be consistent and deductively closed in the 
finite/countable/complete sense (and possibly conditional on some evidential 
proposition) if and only if this agent’s degree of disbelief function is a 
finitely/countable/completely minimitive ranking function and the agent updates 
according to Plain/Spohn/Shenoy Conditionalization when she receives information 
of the appropriate format. 
Seen this way, the axioms and update rules of ranking theory are nothing but a diachronic 
version of consistency and deductive closure. 
 
FUTURE TRENDS 
One question in artificial intelligence is how an agent should update her epistemic 
state if she learns new conceptual information without also learning anything factual 
about the world she lives in. There are several ways in which such a conceptual change 
may occur. The agent may learn a new concept as when an enological ignoramus learns 
the concept barrique. Or the agent may learn that she has omitted a possibility from her 
set of worlds as when an enological illiterate learns that there are rosé wines besides red 
and white wines. All these conceptual changes involve the adoption of a new set of 
 worlds W and, consequently, a new field of propositions A on the side of the agent. None 
of these conceptual changes seems to be adequately modeled by any of the formalisms 
mentioned at the beginning. Ranking theory is able to adequately model those conceptual 
changes by employing the so called ur or tabula rasa ranking – i.e. that ranking function 
that assigns rank 0 to every proposition. If the agent adds new possibilities to her set of 
worlds she should simply assign rank 0 to all those new possibilities. Similarly in case the 
agent replaces the old worlds by richer worlds. Huber (2008) discusses this and other 
future trends. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Ranking functions are an indispensable tool for artificial intelligence. First, they 
seem to adequately model most if not all of those phenomena that are dealt with in both 
qualitative as well as quantitative approaches to uncertainty. Second, they provide a link 
between these two classes of approaches that has been missing so far. Third, they can 
deal with phenomena that neither qualitative nor quantitative approaches seem to be able 
to deal with. 
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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Belief: An agent with ranking function : A  N{} believes A if and only if (W\A) > 
0 – equivalently, if and only if (W\A) > (A). 
Belief Set: The belief set of an agent with ranking function : A  N{} is the set of 
propositions the agent believes, Bel = {A  A: (W\A) > 0}. 
 Conditional Ranking Function: The conditional ranking function (|): AA  
N{} based on the ranking function  on A is defined such that for all 
propositions A, B in A: (A|B) = (AB) – (B) if A  , and (|B) = . 
Completely Minimitive Ranking Function: A ranking function  on a -field of 
propositions A is completely minimitive if and only if (B) = min{(A): A  B} 
for each set of propositions B  A. 
Countably Minimitive Ranking Function: A ranking function  on a -field of 
propositions A is countably minimitive if and only if (A1…An) = min{(A1), 
…, (An), …} for all propositions A1  A,… An  A, … 
Pointwise Ranking Function: A function  from the set of worlds W into the natural 
numbers N, : W  N, is a pointwise ranking function on W if and only if (w) = 0 
for at least one world w in W. 
Degree of Disbelief: An agent’s degree of disbelief in the proposition A is the number of 
information sources providing the information A that it would take for the agent to 
give up her disbelief that A if those information sources were independent and 
minimally positively reliable. 
Degree of Entrenchment: An agent’s degree of entrenchment for the proposition A is 
the number of information sources providing the information A that it takes for the 
agent to give up her disbelief in A. 
Ranking Function: A function  on a field of propositions A over a set of worlds W into 
the natural numbers extended by , : A  N{}, is a (finitely minimitive) 
ranking function on A if and only if for all propositions A, B in A: (W) = 0, () 
= , (AB) = min{(A), (B)}. 
